

## Message Text

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21/42

ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 NEA-07 IO-03 ISO-00 SS-07 NSC-06 AID-01

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9676

INFO AMEM ASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMCONSUL NAPLES

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 0227

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (NUMEROUS GARBLES IN TEXT)

NAPLES PASS CONGRESSMAN MORGAN

TEHRAN FOR KRIZEK

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: FPRO, XF, IS, US

SUBJECT: CODEL MORGAN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN

SUMMARY: IN JANUARY 9 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN, MEMBERS OF CODEL MORGAN NOTED CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT MIDDLE EAST AID, EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF MOVEMENT ON PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ISSUES, AND SHARED THEIR IMPRESSION THAT SADAT SINCERELY SEEKS ADDITIONAL PROGRESS TO PEACE SETTLEMENTS. RABIN REVIEWED ISRAELI POSITIONS ON CURRENT NEGOTIATING ISSUES, WARNING CODEL THAT JANUARY 12 UNSC DEBATE COULD LEAD TO STAGNATION IF CURRENT NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK OF RESOLUTION 242 AND 338 IS UNDERMINED. ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE  
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HE SAID ISRAEL WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH JORDANIAN DLELGATION

INCLUDING WEST BANK PALESTINIANS, BUT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH PLO. HE AFFIRMED ISRAELI READINESS FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS ON GOLAN HEIGHTS AND BLAMED ASAD FOR CURRENT IMPASSE BY HIGHLIGHTING HIS REFUSAL TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT FORD ON NEXT STEPS. IMPLEMENTATION OF SINAI II WAS PROCEEDING WELL, BUT SADAT FACED COMPLEX INTER-ARAB PROBLEM REQUIRING HIS SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN CAUSE DESPITE PLO ATTACKS ON EGYPT. ON DECEMBER 2 IDF STRIKE IN LEBANON, RABIN REITERATED THAT THIS WAS OPERATION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS AND DENIED THAT IT REPRESENTED RESPONSE TO NOVEMBER 30 UNSC DECISION. FINALLY, HE CHARACTERIZED US AID TO ISRAEL AS ESSENTIAL FOR MIDDLE EAST STABILITY AND REPEATED WELL-KNOWN VIEW THAT STRONG ISRAEL IS NECESSARY FOR SUSTAINING NEGOTIATING MOMENTUM. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ONE AND A HALF HOUR DISCUSSION JANUARY 9 IN HIS TEL AVIV OFFICE, PRIME MINISTER RABIN CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SCENE WITH MEMBERS OF CODEL MORGAN. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS.

2. THE JANUARY 12 UNSC DEBATE. AFTER OUTLINING SYRIAN/SOVIET/PLO PLAN TO BLOCK NEGOTIATING MOMENTUM, RABIN SAID JANUARY 12 MEETING CONSTITUTED CRUCIAL TEST FOR NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK MAINTAINED FOR PAST EIGHT YEARS IN RESOLUTION 242 AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN 338. CHARACTERIZING SYRIAN/PLO OBJECTIVE AS CHANGE OR ELIMINATION OF THIS FOUNDATION, HE WARNED THAT THEIR SUCCESS COULD LEAD TO GREATER STAGNATION AND THAT HE WOULD NOT ADVISE ANYONE TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD THEN HAPPEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS, RABIN SAID THAT SECRETARY AND ALLON ARE TRYING TO REACH UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. HE SAID THAT NO ONE COULD PREDICT OUTCOME OF JANUARY 12 DEBATE.

3. THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.

A) PLO. RABIN REITERATED ISRAELI POSITION AGAINST DEALING WITH PLO, NOTING THAT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT CALLED FOR ELIMINATION OF JEWISH STATE IN CONFIDENTIAL

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AREA. CHALLENGING PLO RHETORIC ON A SECULAR DEMOCRATIC STATE, HE SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED FOR ELECTION IN WHICH ALL RESIDENTS IN AREA WEST OF JORDAN RIVER, JEWS AND ARABS, WOULD HAVE AN EQUAL VOTE. BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS, HE ADDED, THAT PLO WOULD NOT ABIDE BY RESULT WHICH WOULD CONFIRM THAT MAJORITY WISHES TO PRESERVE JEWISH STATE. HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT CREATION OF A MINI-STATE (I.E., A THIRD STATE) ON

THE WEST BANK WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ANY SOLUTION.

B) JORDANIAN OPTION. RABIN SAID ISRAEL WAS PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN AND WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF JORDANIAN DELEGATION TO GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE WEST BANK LEADERS "OR WHOMEVER THEY WANT". HE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT HUSSEIN WAS AVAILABLE IN PRINCIPLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT SAY SO PUBLICLY. TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINT HE NOTED THAT HUSSEIN HAD NEVER CUT HIS TIES WITH THE WEST BANK, PAYING SALARIES OF 6-7,000 LOCAL OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN JORDANIAN INFLUENCE THERE. HUSSEIN WAS KEEPING PLO OUT OF JORDAN BECAUSE HE KNEW FULL WELL THAT HE WOULD BE ITS FIRST VICTIM. RABIN ADDED THAT ISRAELI POSITION AGAINST TALKS WITH PLO REPRESENTED HUSSEIN'S ONLY HOPE TO HAVE HIS OWN ROLE REESTABLISHED IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND THAT HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THIS FULL WELL. AS TO ARAB SUPPORT FOR PLO, HE RECALLED THAT FROM JANUARY 1964 (WHEN PLO WAS ESTABLISHED) UNTIL JUNE 1967 THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT BY ARAB COUNTRIES TO PROMOTE IDEA OF A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE IN WEST BANK AND GAZA.

4. EGYPT AFTER SINAI II. RABIN OBSERVED THAT U.S., ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAD ACCEPTED NEED TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE THROUGH INTERIM AGREEMENTS, AND NOTED THAT SIGNIFICANCE OF SINAI II WAS NOT SO MUCH ITS TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS AS THE PROCESS OF ACCOMMODATION. ISRAEL HAD NO PROBLEM WITH EGYPTIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF SINAI II AND, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, EGYPT HAD NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT ISRAEL. EGYPT WAS NOW UNDER ATTACK BY SYRIA AND PLO FOR WHAT THEY CHARACTERIZED AS ITS BETRAYAL OF ARAB CAUSE. WALDHEIM HAD TOLD HIM IN NOVEMBER THAT SYRIA

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9677

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
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WAS ATTACKING EGYPT MORE THAN ISRAEL. ASKED BY CONGRESSMAN LOGOMARSINO WHETHER SADAT IN FACT WAS AS STRONGLY BEHIND PLO AS HE SAID PUBLICLY, RABIN REPLIED THAT SADAT CONFRONTED COMPLICATED INTER-ARAB SITUATION. PLO HAD ATTACKED SADAT FOR ENTERING INTO SINAI II AND HE HAD RESPONDED BY CLOSING DOWN PLO RADIO STATION IN CAIRO. BUT HE COULD NOT DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM PALESTINIAN CAUSE. FACT THAT SADAT HAD PUBLICLY CALLED ON PLO TO STATE WHAT IT WANTED SUGGESTED THAT HE HIMSELF WAS UNSURE OF ITS OBJECTIVES. CONGRESSMAN FOUNTAIN OBSERVED THAT SADAT SEEMED TO BE IN POSITION RE PLO SIMILAR TO THAT OF HUSSEIN. CONGRESSMAN LAGOMARSINO NOTED THAT SADAT SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO ABIDE BY DECISION OF PALESTINIAN MAJORITY. RABIN REEMPHASIZED THAT THESE STATEMENTS UNDERScoreD COMPLEXITY OF SADAT'S SITUATION.

5. SYRIA AND GOLAN HEIGHTS. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY RE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, RABIN CONTRASTED ISRAELI POSITION OF READINESS FOR FURTHER TERRITORIAL

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CONCESSIONS ON GOLAN HEIGHTS WITH ASAD'S REJECTION OF TWO INVITATIONS FROM PRESIDENT FORD FOR U.S./SYRIAN DISCUSSIONS ON NEXT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION PREVENTED HIM FROM MAKING OPEN STATEMENT ON SETTLEMENTS ISSUE BUT THAT ISRAELI READINESS FOR CONCESSIONS ON GOLAN HEIGHTS "MIGHT INCLUDE MANY THINGS INCLUDING WHAT YOU ARE WORRYING ABOUT." RABIN AT LATER STAGE IN CONVERSATION CHARACTERIZED SYRIAN REGIME AS TOUGH, SHREWD, EXTREMIST AND UNPREDICTABLE. AS CENTER OF ARAB NATIONALISM AND EXTREMISM, SYRIA WAS HEAD OF FORCES TRYING TO BLOCK U.S. MEDIATED NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

6. DECEMBER 2 AIR STRIKE ON LEBANON. CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY NOTED THAT U.S. PUBLIC OPINION WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF DECEMBER 2 IDF RAID ON LEBANON. IN REPLY RABIN

SAID THAT LEBANON WAS ONLY STATE FROM WHICH PLO PRESENTLY OPERATED AGAINST ISRAEL (WITH EXCEPTION OF TWO RAIDS FROM SYRIA JUST BEFORE NOVEMBER 30 RENEWAL OF UNDOF MANDATE). RABIN SAID THAT DECEMBER 2 AIR RAID WAS NOT A REACTION TO NOVEMBER 30 UNSC DECISION, CABINET HAD APPROVED THE OPERATION TWO WEEKS EARLIER, AND HE PERSONALLY HAD DECIDED TO HOLD UP ITS EXECUTION UNTIL AFTER UNSC DEBATE WAS CONCLUDED. WHILE PLO CLAIMED THAT VICTIMS WERE CIVILIANS, THEY HAVE NEVER DISCLOSED THE NUMBER OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN. ISRAELI OBJECTIVES WERE EXCLUSIVELY TERRORIST BASES WHICH PLO INTENTIONALLY PLACED IN REFUGEE CAMPS.

7. THE AID BILL. CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD INDICATED POSSIBILITY THAT MIDDLE EAST COMPONENT OF U.S. FOREIGN AID WAS LIKELY TO REMAIN AT OR NEAR \$2.5 BILLION LEVEL FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND SUMMARIZED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN CONTINUING MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS. RABIN PROVIDED STANDARD RATIONALE ON ISRAELI AID REQUEST, EMPHASIZING THAT STRONG ISRAEL WAS ESSENTIAL FOR PEACE. HE RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON, WHO HAD EXTENDED MASSIVE SUPPORT TO ISRAEL, WAS ONLY U.S. PRESIDENT TO BE WELCOMED IN ARAB CAPITALS BECAUSE ARABS UNDERSTOOD THAT

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U.S. ALONE HAD INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL. TO PREVENT A NEW MIDDLE EAST WAR, ISRAEL MUST MAINTAIN BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER ON ONE HAND AND SHOW READINESS TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON OTHER. NEW WAR WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE FOR U.S. AND FREE WORLD. U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT WAS CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST AID PACKAGE SINCE IT COULD FURTHER EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES.

8. PEACE PROSPECTS. RABIN STRESSED THAT THERE WERE NO SHORT CUTS TO PEACE, THAT THERE WAS NO ANSWER AS TO HOW LONG ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE WOULD CONTINUE, AND THAT GRADUALISM WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION.  
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